Steve: Developing on the Edge - Virus in a firefox language plugin: the perils of the community
Steve: Developing on the Edge
Thoughts on development, Web-services, technology and mountains.
8May
Thu2008
Virus in a firefox language plugin: the perils of the community

If you use a computer, and worry about its security, you should subscribe to the SANS diary, which keeps you up to date with the networks big security issues.

Today the news is Mozilla Firefox bug ID 432406: Virus found in Vietnamese language pack

It looks like

  1. The person who builds the language pack's network was compromised with a win32 virus that patches advertisment JS into .xhtml files.
  2. The virus patched the help files for the language pack
  3. Which was upload in February
  4. This was before the virus scanners recognised the malware (always the problem), so the file passed the initial security checks
  5. And not found until May, when a rescan of the repository caught it

As it takes Mozilla more than a 1 week to scan the repository, they aren't in a position to detect malware that creeps in ahead of the signatures being updated.

This is pretty scary. It shows that you cant trust .xpi files, even from mozilla.org but I doubt most PC virus scanners look in them. It also shows that the security of OSS products is limited to its weakest link: the security of the computers of the people who make the contributions. Which means that you are pretty vulnerable, as a lot of machines are a mess out there, especially windows ones, where the default low-energy state is 0wned.

When you think that the whole OSS platform is based on an explicit trust of the repositories and the source, that's very scary.

The virus scanning process needs to be improved. A month? Someone needs to copy all the files up to HDFS and then run the scanner as a Hadoop Map/Reduce algorithm...make each signature scan a single map and stream the tasks past the files.

Comments

Also the perils of the proprietaryreply to this thread
On 8 May 2008 at 10: 56 Nzheretic commented:
17 June 2002 : Microsoft accidentally ships Nimda in Korea
http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2002/06/va_nimda_korea.html
"Microsoft has confirmed that it accidentally distributed to developers a copy of the W32/Nimda virus in Korean versions of its Visual Studio.net package."
A solution to this issue would to require all packages that contain either binaries or un-restricted scripting to be built by a trust-able third party.
See step 12 Trusted Build Agent (TBA) in
http://itheresies.blogspot.com/2004_10_01_archive.html
On 8 May 2008 at 11: 41 Steve Loughran commented:
good point. I had an implicit assumption that the proprietary folk are less at risk because they tend to have managed machines, but they are still vulnerable -especially if you use Windows systems anywhere in the production process. FWIW, we build releases on Linux, but some developers use windows (including my laptop) so we are vulnerable.